Republic of the Philippines
CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS M a n I l a
MRS. CONSORCIA PRISNO, Petitioner-Appellant,
CBAA CASE NO. V-20 – versus –
CITY ASSESSOR OF TACLOBAN CITY,
Respondent-Appellee,
– and –
LOCAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS OF TACLOBAN CITY,
Appellee. x——————————————————–x
R E S O L U T I O N
For lack of jurisdiction, this Board, in a Decision dated February 27, 2004,
dismissed Petitioner-Appellant’s appeal in the above-entitled case. Not satisfied,
Petitioner-Appellant filed the instant Petition for Reconsideration.
Alleging that she received a copy of the said Decision on March 26, 2004,
Petitioner-Appellant seeks a reconsideration of the said Decision on the following
grounds, to wit:
“I. The alleged delay in the filing of the appeal to the Local Board of
Assessment Appeals and to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals is not
sufficient ground for its dismissal;
“II. That there is a need for reassessment of the property considering
that the assessment was excessive, unwarranted, inequitable, confiscatory and
unconstitutional and due to a major change in its actual use.”
Citing the cases of Segundo Toribion, et al. vs. Abdulwahid, et al. (GR No.
L-57821, January 17, 1985) and Cayetano v. Munsod (GR No. 100113),
Petitioner-Appellant argues that, if indeed the appeals to the LBAA the CBAA
were filed out of time, “the CBAA should not have dismissed the case due to
technical deficiencies.”
Reference: Book X, pp. 73-77
In a number of cases, this Board had always been consistent in its ruling
that tardiness in filing an appeal is fatal to the appellant’s case (Bataan Pulp &
Paper Mills, Inc. vs. Provincial Assessor of Bataan, CBAA Case No. 20,
December 23, 1974; A.A. Munda Overseas Trading, Inc. vs. City Assessor of
General Santos City, CBAA Case No. 3, September 4, 1975; City Assessor of
Quezon City vs. Rodolfo Lejano, CBAA Case No. 44, June 27, 1975; City
Assessor of Baguio City vs. Benguet Consolidated, Inc. CBAA Case No. 45,
October 17, 1975).
The LBAA of Tacloban City did not have jurisdiction over the appeal of
Petitioner-Appellant because said appeal was filed beyond the 60-day period
prescribed under Section 226 of R.A. 7160. Settled is the principle that the
requirements regarding the perfection of appeals within the reglementary period
is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional (Roman Catholic Bishop vs. Director
of Lands, 34 Phil. 623 [1916]; Provincial Assessor of Bulacan vs. Luzon Cement,
et al., CBAA Case No. 16).
Likewise, this Board does not have jurisdiction over the Petitioner-
Appellant’s appeal from the local board’s decision said appeal was filed beyond
the period prescribed under Section 229 (c) of R.A. 7160. Settled is the doctrine
that the 30-day period within which to appeal the local board’s decision to the
Central Board is mandatory and jurisdictional. Failure to perfect an appeal from
the judgment or decision within the period allowed by law bars the appeal and
renders the judgment or decision final and executory (City Assessor of Tagaytay
vs. Chua, CBAA Case No. 54, April 19, 1976; City Assessor of Tagaytay vs.
Pedro R. Rances, CBAA Case No. 57, April 19, 1976).
Even the instant Petition for Reconsideration was filed out of time. Section
3, Rule V of the Rules of Procedure Before the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals states that “An aggrieved party may file a motion for reconsideration
within fifteen (15) days from the date he receives the Central Board’s decision,
resolution or order sought to be reconsidered.” Petitioner-Appellant admitted that
Reference: Book X, pp. 73-77
she received a copy of this Board’s Decision on March 26, 2004. She had,
therefore, only until April 10, 2004 within which to file her said petition for
reconsideration. However, the envelope containing her Petition for
Reconsideration was post-marked at the Tacloban City Post Office as registered
mail on April 12, 2004, or two (2) days after the expiration of the period
prescribed in the afore-cited rule. This Board could have overlooked or
disregarded this particular tardiness. But then, again, it does not really matter.
Petitioner-Appellant, in her instant petition, admitted that she “is not
cognizant of the prescriptive period of cases.” On the principle of ignorantia legis
nonimen excusat, appellant lost her right to appeal for failure to file the appeal on
time. (Arellano vs. City Assessor of Quezon City, CBAA Case No. 2, July 12,
1974).
We agree with Petitioner-Appellant that rules of Procedure should be
liberally construed to the end that substantiated justice may be served. In fact,
Section 229(b) of R.A. 7160 states that the proceedings of the LBAA “shall be
conducted solely for the purpose of ascertaining the facts without necessarily
adhering to technical rules applicable in judicial proceedings.” And in CBAA Case
No. 154 (Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation -versus- the
Board of Assessment Appeals of Masbate, et al.), it was ruled that “the
requirement on formalities and procedure should be liberally interpreted to give
substance and meaning to the law and not to frustrate the rights of the
individuals.” (Asperac vs. Intchon, 16 SCRA 921 [1966]; Manila Railroad vs.
Attorney General, 20 Phil. 523 [1971] and that “failure to file a notice of appeal
under oath is not a ground for dismissal of an appeal.” such deficiency being
curative in nature. Furthermore, “absence of the oath is a formal and not a
jurisdictional defect” (Valino vs. Muñoz, 35 SCRA 700 [1967]; Jesus E. Sanchez
vs. Provincial Assessor of Batangas, CBAA Case No. 252, August 12, 1991).
The circumstances attendant in the cases cited by Petitioner-Appellant and
in those cases cited in the next preceding paragraph are, however, substantially
Reference: Book X, pp. 73-77
different from the conditions or circumstances present in the instant case. While
the conditions or circumstances surrounding the former are merely procedural in
nature, those in the latter are mandatory and jurisdictional.
Procedural rules are not, however, to be disdained as mere technicalities
that may be ignored at will to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law is
important in insuring the effective enforcement of substantive rights by providing
for a system under which suitors may be heard in peaceful confrontation before a
judge whose authority they acknowledge. The other alternative is the settlement
of their conflict through the barrel of a gun (Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
92862, July 4, 1991, 198 SCRA 806, cited in Herrera, Remedial Law, 2000 Ed.,
p. 277).
Rules of procedure are intended to insure the orderly administration of
justice and the protection of substantive rights in judicial and extra-judicial
proceedings. It is a mistake to suppose that substantive law and adjective law
are contradictory to each other or, as has often been suggested, that
enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if it will result in
prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants. This is not exactly true; the
concept is much misunderstood. As a matter of fact, the policy of the courts is to
give effect to both kinds of law, as complementing each other, in the just and
speedy resolution of the dispute between the parties. Observance of both
substantive rights is equally guaranteed by due process whatever the source of
such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court (Limpot
v. Court of Appeals, 170 SCRA 367 [1989]; Lim Tupaz v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 89571, Feb. 6, 1991, 193 SCRA 597; Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
92862, July 04, 1991, 198 SCRA 806; Sps. Ruben and Luz Galang v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 76221, July 29, 1991, 199 SCRA 683; cited in Herrera,
Remedial Law, 2000 Ed., p. 277).
Strict observance of the Rules indispensable to the prevention of needless
delays and to the orderly and speedy dispatch of judicial business is an
Reference: Book X, pp. 73-77
imperative necessity (Manila RR Co. v. Attorney General, 20 Phil. 523; cited in
Herrera, Remedial Law, 2000 Ed., p. 278).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for
Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, June 01, 2004.
(Signed) CESAR S. GUTIERREZ
Chairman
(Signed)
ANGEL P. PALOMARES Member
(Signed) RAFAEL O. CORTES
Member
Reference: Book X, pp. 73-77