Republic of the Philippines

CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS Manila

PILILLA POULTRY PROCESSING PLANT, INC.,
Petitioner-Appellant,

– versus –

CBAA Case No. L-22 THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF
ASSESSMENT APPEALS OF RIZAL, Appellee,

– and –

THE MUNICIPAL ASSESSOR OF PILILLA AND THE PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF RIZAL,
Respondents-Appellees, x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

R E S O L U T I O N

Now before us is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Appellant,

Pililla Poultry Processing Plant, Inc. (“PPPPI” for brevity), assailing this Board’s

Decision, the dispositive portion of which is quoted below, viz:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Board of Assessment Appeals of Rizal declaring subject properties as taxable is hereby affirmed in toto and that the herein appeal of PPPPI is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

The motion herein made by the appellant reiterates the following matters

as the basis for its reversal:

1) That 1997 was a dry run period for PPPPI to operate and therefore Section 221 of the Local Government Code is the applicable provision in the instant case;

2) That the certification of Hon. Nicodemes Patenia is presumed to have been issued in the course of the performance of his official duty and enjoys the presumption of validity until it is annulled by competent authority pursuant to Section 30 of the aforecited Code.

On the first basis, the re-assertion that 1997 was a dry run year does not

in any way change the fact that PPPPI commenced operation in that year which

was the point of consideration why the assessor’s office made the required

assessments of the property in question. Besides, when we speak of dry-run,

the tryout takes only days but not one (1) year for if that is so, all other juridical

Reference: Book VIII, pp. 287-289

persons will take that as a precedent for them to evade the mandatory realty

taxes. To recapitulate our stand, it is our decision that whether dry-run or not,

proven or not, Section 222 of the Local Government Code is very clear on the

matter and therefore the proper law that should be applied and not Section 221.

As to the second basis, this matter was well-tackled in our decision. But

by way of addition thereto, the Board is in the conclusion that if a certain act, in

this case that of the Mayor, is found to be contrary to law, then such a

certification issued can be considered as a mere scrap of paper conferring no

rights nor obligations whatsoever.

Furthermore, appellant clings to the provision mentioned in Section 30 of

the Local Government Code that “the governor shall review all executive orders

promulgated by the municipal mayor”. Apparently, herein appellant has

overlooked the fact that the law it is citing requires that “copies of such orders

shall be forwarded to the Governor within three (3) days”. Now, the question is

“Is there a written executive order for the Governor to review? None, we

believe. Because if there is, such would have been submitted to us in support of

the appeal. A certification is not a written order in its simple or even strict sense.

Lastly, granting that there is a written executive order which we have

doubted ever since, such must comply with the legal requirement that only

through an ordinance duly approved that tax exemptions, incentives or reliefs

can be granted. This is very clear in our decision and even in the admissions

stated in the position paper of the Appellant PPPPI.

WHEREFORE, there being no sufficient justification nor cogent reason to

disturb or alter our earlier decision, the Petitioner-Appellant’s Motion for

Reconsideration is hereby denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Manila, Philippines, July 19, 2001.

Reference: Book VIII, pp. 287-289

(Signed) CESAR S. GUTIERREZ
Chairman

(Signed)
ANGEL P. PALOMARES Member

(Signed) BENJAMIN M. KASALA
Member

Reference: Book VIII, pp. 287-289