Republic of the Philippines
CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS M a n I l a

CAMBAYAS MINING CORPORATION and HERITAGE RESOURCES & MINING CORPORATION (Service Contractor),
Petitioners-Appellants,

– versus –

THE PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF, EASTERN SAMAR,
Respondent- Appellee

CBAA CASE NO. V-23

LBAA Case No. 001-(2005)

– and –

THE LOCAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS OF THE PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR,
Appellees,
x———————————————————–x

D E C I S I O N

This Appeal, received by this Board on October 13, 2005, is from the

Resolution rendered by the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of the Province

of Eastern Samar on August 10, 2005.

As culled from the records, Petitioners-Appellants received on January 27,

2005 eleven (11) Notices of Assessments bearing ARP/TD Nos. 0209026-0025

to 0209026-00035, all dated November 8, 2004, issued by the Provincial

Assessor of the Province of Eastern Samar, Respondent-Appellee herein,

covering various properties allegedly belonging to Petitioners-Appellants and

situated in Brgy. Cagusu-an, Homonhon Island, Guiuan, Eastern Samar.

On March 21, 2005, Petitioners-Appellants appealed the said assessments

to the Appellee Local Board, alleging that (1) the Respondent Provincial

Assessor has no authority, power and jurisdiction to issue the said eleven (11)

Notices of Assessment; and (2) that, granting arguendo that Respondent

Provincial Assessor of the Province of Eastern Samar has such authority, power

Reference: Book XIII, pp. 54-76

and jurisdiction to issue such Notices of Assessment, the real estate

assessments made thereon are unreasonable and without factual basis.

Petitioners-Appellants argued:

1. that Respondent-Appellee Provincial Assessor had no authority to

issue the questioned assessments for the simple reason that the Schedule of

Fair Market Values, upon which the said assessments were based, was not

enacted by ordinance by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar, but

approved by the said Sanggunian through a mere resolution, contrary to the

provisions of Sections 212 and 218, both of R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the

Local Government Code of 1991.

2. that the machineries covered by the questioned assessments were

acquired in the year 2000 by Petitioner Heritage as second-hand units from

Alamag Processing Corporation which originally acquired the same sometime in

1998; and that, therefore, the “Estimated Cost of Machinery at Present (2004)”

should have been subjected to depreciation for six (6) years (1998-2004) at the

rate of five percent (5%) per annum, in accordance with the provisions of Section

225 of R.A. 7160.

3. that the assessment on the entire area of the mining claim allegedly

consisting of 3,709.3200 hectares owned by the Republic of the Philippines is

highly erroneous, irregular, illegal and not supported by both fact and law since

Petitioners-Appellants enjoy the “beneficial use” of only 100 hectares as defined

under Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) 9510-010-301C issued by

the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) on August 16,

2000 to Petitioner Heritage; and

4. that the improvements, consisting of office building, staff house,

shop and power plant, should have been subjected to reasonable allowances for

depreciation since said improvements were constructed of light materials only as

early as the year 1993.

Reference: Book XIII, pp. 54-76

Respondent-Appellee Provincial Assessor, through the Provincial Legal

Officer of Eastern Samar, in his Answer filed with the Local Board, averred:

1. that Petitioners-Appellants failed to submit to the Office of the

Provincial Assessor or the Municipal Assessor of Guiuan a sworn statement of

the true value of their real properties pursuant to Section 202 of the Local

Government Code of 1991;

2. that Respondent Provincial Assessor is mandated to assess the

properties in question for failure of Petitioners-Appellants to make the

declaration, pursuant to Section 204 of the same Code;

3. that, although the approval of the Schedule of Fai Market Values

was entitled “Resolution No. 45, Series of 2002: A Resolution by the Sanggunian

Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar approving the Schedule of Market Values for the

2002 General Revision of Real Properties in the Province of Eastern Samar”, the

intent or contents therein partake of the nature of or is actually an Ordinance;

4. that, in the case of Province of Nueva Ecija vs. Imperial Mining

Company, G.R. No. L-59463, the Supreme Court declared that Section 18 of

P.D. 464 states that, “for purposes of taxation, mineral lands not covered by

lease shall be appraised at 55% of their market value to be determined by the

Secretary of Finance upon consultation with the Director of Mines; provided,

however, that mineral lands covered by leases shall be declared for taxation

purposes either by the owner of the land or lessee and the assessment level

thereof shall be maintained at the current 50%”;

5. that, pursuant to Sections 231 and 252 of R.A. 7160, the Local

Board should require the Petitioners to first pay the taxes imposed and to show

proof of such payment; that the appeal before the Local Board was premature for

failure by Petitioners to first pay the questioned tax assessments as supposedly

required under the provisions of Sections 231 and 252 of RA 7160; and

6. that the Local Board is bereft of jurisdiction to entertain the appeal

because the question raised in the said appeal is the very authority and power of

Reference: Book XIII, pp. 54-76

the assessor to impose the assessment, not just the reasonableness or

unreasonableness of the amount assessed by the provincial assessor.

On July 13, 2005, the Local Board issued an Order to the Petitioners to

submit the proof of payment of realty taxes within five (5) days from receipt, in

order for the Local Board to acquire jurisdiction of the case.

On August 1, 2005, the Local Board received Petitioner’s Motion for

Reconsideration with prayer to set aside the Order dated July 13, 2005 and to

Submit the case for Resolution, without requiring Petitioners to show or submit

proof of payment.

So, on August 10, 2005, the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of the

Province of Eastern Samar issued the questioned Resolution, the dispositive

portion of which reads as follows:

“As it appears, some of the issues involved are interrelated, except to the issue on the non-payment of taxes. The point at issue therefore is ‘whether or not the Local Board of Assessment Appeals has the authority to entertain the appeal, inspite of the non-payment of real property taxes as condition precedent of any appeal before this Board.

“This Board shall resolve the issue in accordance with Section 231 of RA 7160, thus:

‘SEC. 231. Effect of Appeal on the Payment of Real Property Tax. – Appeal on assessment of real property made under the provisions of this Code shall, in no case, suspend the collection of the corresponding realty taxes on the property involved as assessed by the provincial or city assessor, without prejudice to subsequent adjustment depending upon the outcome of the appeal.’

“In CBAA Case No. L-06 dated October 15, 1994, it explained Section 37 of PD 464, which is the same provision of law as quoted above. It was held that ‘this provision of law is explicit and self-explanatory. Collection of the realty taxes as assessed by the city assessor shall not be suspended by an appeal filed thereunder. x x x. We believe that any other interpretation would defeat or nullify this provision, for if the appeal were entertained without requiring the protestant-appellant to pay the realty tax as assessed by the provincial or city assessor the effect would be that the appeal will have suspended the collection of the said taxes, contrary to the express mandate of said provision. Any interpretation which would defeat or nullify a provision is by settled rules of construction to be abhorred and avoided.’

“From the context thereat, Petitioners should pay the realty taxes on the properties in question before this Board may entertain its appeal.

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the herein appeal of the petitioners, is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.”

Hence, this appeal.

Reference: Book XIII, pp. 54-76

Alleging that they received a copy of the questioned Resolution on

September 19, 2005, Petitioners-Appellants raised the following errors:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

[I]

THE LOCAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS OF THE PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS SHOULD FIRST PAY THE REALTY TAXES ASSESSED IN THE SUBJECT NOTICES OF ASSESSMENTS BEFORE IT MAY ENTERTAIN THE APPEAL.

[II]

THE LOCAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS OF THE PROVINCE OF

EASTERN SAMAR SERIOUSLY RESPONDENT-APPELLEE HAS

ERRED IN NOT NO AUTHORITY,

DECLARING THAT POWER AND/OR

JURISDICTION TO ISSUE THE SUBJECT NOTICES OF ASSESSMENTS ON THE REAL PROPERTIES OF PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS.

[III]

THE LOCAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS OF THE PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR BADLY ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE SUBJECT NOTICES OF ASSESSMENTS ARE UNREASONABLE AND WITHOUT FACTUAL BASIS, GRANTING ARGUENDO, THAT RESPONDENT-APPELLEE HAS THE AUTHORITY, POWER AND/OR JURISDICTION TO ISSUE SUCH ASSESSMENTS.

[IV]

THE LOCAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS OF THE PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR FATALLY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL FOR LACK OF MERIT.

Respondent-Appellee’s Answer/Comment on Appeal finally reached this

Board on November 30, 2005 and Petitioner-Appellant’s Reply thereto also

reached this Board on January 6, 2006. We find these documents as re-

statements of their respective previous positions: those of Respondent-Appellee

in its Answer filed with the Local Board and those of Petitioner-Appellant in its

Appeal filed with this Board on October 13, 2005.

FIRST ISSUE

Simply stated, the first issue is: WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS-

APPELLANTS SHOULD FIRST PAY THE REALTY TAXES ON THE

Reference: Book XIII, pp. 54-76

QUESTIONED ASSESSMENTS BEFORE THE LOCAL BOARD MAY

ENTERTAIN PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS’ APPEAL.

The pronouncement by the CBAA in Case No. L-06 quoted by the Local

Board was apparently based on Opinion No. 99, S. 1976, of the Ministry of

Justice in which the then Minister of Justice opined that the provisions of Section

37 of PD 464 “indicates that the requirement refers only to the taxes imposed

based on the assessment which is subject of the appeal” and that the concern of

the Board (referring to the Local Board) should be “the payment of taxes based

on the questioned assessment, proof of payment of which the appellant must

have to show before the Board may proceed to hear the appeal . . .”

It should be noted that, before the Presidential Decree No. 464, otherwise

known as the Real Property Tax Code, which was promulgated on May 20, 1974

and took effect on June 1, 1974, there was Commonwealth Act No. 470,

otherwise known as the Assessment Law which was promulgated by the National

Assembly on June 16, 1939, followed by Presidential Decree No. 76 which was

promulgated on December 6, 1972. Presidential Decree No. 464 was, of course,

expressly repealed by Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local

Government Code of 1991 which took effect on January 1, 1992.

Section 54 of the Assessment Law, CA 470, partly reads as follows:

“SEC. 54. Restriction Upon Power of Court to Impeach Tax. – No court shall entertain any suit assailing the validity of a tax assessed under this Act until the taxpayer shall have paid, under protest, the taxes assessed against him, nor shall any court declare any tax invalid by reason of . . .”

No. 7 of Par. 3, of Presidential Decree No. 76 provides, thus:

“The appeal, referring to appeals to the Provincial or City Board of Assessment Appeals and to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals, however, shall not suspend the collection of the corresponding realty taxes as assessed by the provincial or city assessor, without prejudice to subsequent adjustment depending upon the final outcome of the appeal.”

The above provisions of PD 76 are similar in substance to those of Section

37 of PD 464 which, in turn, was reproduced in Section 231 of RA 7160, which

reads as follows:

“SEC. 231. Effect of Appeal on the Payment of Real Property Tax. – Appeal on assessment of real property made under the provisions of this Code

Reference: Book XIII, pp. 54-76

shall, in no case, suspend the collection of the corresponding realty taxes on the property involved as assessed by the provincial or city assessor, without prejudice to subsequent adjustment depending upon the outcome of the appeal.”

Note that Section 54 of CA 470, the earliest of the laws cited above,

expressly and specifically prohibits any court from entertaining any suit assailing

the validity of a tax assessed under said Act until the taxpayer shall have paid,

under protest, the taxes assessed against him. Upon the other hand, the

provisions of No. 7, Par. 3 of PD 76, Section 37 of PD 464, and Section 231 of

RA 7160 merely declare that filing of an appeal “shall, in no case, suspend the

collection of the corresponding realty taxes on the property involved as assessed

by the provincial or city assessor”, meaning that the appeal has no effect,

whatsoever, on the collection of the tax involved.

The phrase “shall, in no case, suspend the collection of the realty taxes”

explains the “effect of appeal on the payment of real property tax”, the latter

being the caption of Section 231 of RA 7160. It simply means that an appeal has

“no effect” on the process of collecting the corresponding realty taxes. The

treasurer concerned shall proceed with the collection of the taxes involved

through the remedies provided for under Sections 265 and 266 of RA 7160,

without even taking cognizance or notice of an appeal being filed since, the

pending appeal cannot be used as a defense by the taxpayer-appellant against

such collection.

If the legislature wanted the corresponding taxes to be paid before the

appeal may be entertained and heard, it could have easily provided so in clear

and unambiguous language as the National Assembly did under Section 54 of

Commonwealth Act No. 470. Compelling a taxpayer to pay the realty tax involved

before its appeal may be entertained and heard is just not one of the remedies

afforded the government under the Local Government Code of 1991.

In Spouses Ramon A. Gonzales and Lilia Yusay vs. Province of Iloilo (38

SCRA 209-227, March 31, 1971), the Supreme Court rejected the contention that

Reference: Book XIII, pp. 54-76

the property owner should first pay the questionable realty tax before lodging an

appeal, thus:

“. . . The Court has therefore adopted the simple test that where an assessment is disputed for whatever ground or reason, be it that the assessment is unjust, erroneous or improper, illegal or void or excessive or unreasonable, that action challenging the assessment, after first exhausting the administrative remedy of appeal to the assessment board, and regardless of whether the corresponding realty tax had been paid and a refund sought, pertains to the exclusive and special jurisdiction of the tax court to the exclusion and special jurisdiction of the tax court to the exclusion of the courts of first instance. Thus, in the recently decided case of Board of Assessment Appeals of Zamboanga del Sur vs. Samar Mining Co. and Court of Appeals, L-28034, Feb. 27, 1971, (The dictum in this case citing Cabanatuan’s ruling that the court’s jurisdiction is confined to the ‘reasonableness or legality’ of the disputed assessment is of course modified and clarified by the present decision), the Court upheld the jurisdiction of the tax court to the rule upon the legality and validity of the disputed real estate assessment, rejecting the contention therein that the property owner should first pay the questioned realty tax before lodging an appeal from the assessment appeals board’s adverse decision to the tax court . . .” (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted case was governed by Republic Act No. 1125, Section 11

of which “does not require that before an appeal from the decision of the Board of

Assessment Appeals can be brought to the Court of Tax Appeals it must be first

shown that the party disputing the assessment had paid under protest the realty

tax being assessed . . . Section 54 of Commonwealth Act No. 470 does not apply

and said section can be considered as impliedly repealed by Sections 11 and 21

of RA 1125”. (Board of Assessment Appeals of Zamboanga del Sur vs. Samar

Mining Co., Inc., supra).

In its earlier decisions, the Central Board of Assessment Appeals stated

that the Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Assessment Appeals of

Zamboanga del Sur vs. Samar Mining Co., Inc., supra, may not be considered a

controlling precedent in those earlier cases involving similar issues, considering

that the appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals was governed by RA 1125, while the

appeals to the Local Boards and to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals

were governed by Commonwealth Act No. 470.

It does not really matter in this case since Commonwealth Act No. 470 had

long been superseded by later laws and, as explained hereinabove, Section 231

of RA 7160, the law presently applicable, does not require prior payment by the

appellant of the realty tax involved before filing an appeal with the Local Board.

Reference: Book XIII, pp. 54-76

It may be argued, further, that the Ministry of Justice’s Opinion No. 99 was

issued in 1976, after the Supreme Court issued the aforequoted decision in the

Gonzales case and, therefore, the former should prevail over the latter. However,

it is an established principle in statutory construction that rules and regulations

and, for that matter, opinions issued by officials, to implement a law cannot go

beyond the terms and provisions of the latter. (People vs. Lim Ho, G.R. No.

14432, July 26, 1960, 106 Phil. 887)

Petitioners-Appellants, to bolster their contention that the Local Board

erred in requiring them to first pay the corresponding tax, quoted a portion of the

Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Alejandro B. Ty, et al. vs. The Hon.

Aurelio C. Trampe, et al. (G.R. No. 117577, December 1, 1995, 250 SCRA 500),

thus:

“In laying down the powers of the Local Board of Assessment Appeals, R.A. 7160 provides in Sec. 229 (b) that ‘(t)he proceedings of the Board should be conducted solely for the purpose of ascertaining the facts . . .’ It follows that appeals to this Board may be fruitfully only where questions of fact are involved. Again, the protest contemplated under Sec. 252 of R.A. 71060 is needed where there is a question as to the reasonableness of the amount assessed. Hence, if a taxpayer disputes the reasonableness of an increase in a real estate tax assessment, he is required to ‘pay first the tax’ under protest. Otherwise, the city or municipal treasurer will not act on his protest. In the case at bench however, the petitioners are questioning the very authority and power of the assessor, acting solely and independently, to impose the assessment and of the treasurer to collect the tax. These are not questions merely of amounts of the increase in the tax but attacks on the very validity of any increase.”

Apparently based on the aforequoted Supreme Court decision,

Respondent-Appellee Provincial Treasurer argues that the Local Board is bereft

of jurisdiction “to entertain the issue questioning the authority of the respondent

to make and issue the questioned assessment. Petitioner’s petition to this

Honorable Board is premised solely on Section 226 of RA 7160, otherwise

known as the Local Government Code of 1991, as above-cited. Closed perusal

of this provision would dictates (sic) that its applicability refers only to the

reasonableness or unreasonableness of the amount assessed by the provincial

assessor, and not where the question raised is on the very authority and power

of the assessor to impose the assessment. The latter issued (sic) should be

threshed out in a separate venue, and not before this Board.”

Reference: Book XIII, pp. 54-76

We do not agree. This case does not involve only questions of law, but

also of facts.

Respondent Provincial Assessor also argues that the Local Board did not

have jurisdiction over the appeal because the realty tax as assessed by the

Provincial Assessor has not been paid pursuant to the provisions of Section 231,

as well as Section 252, both of RA 7160.

There seems to be some confusion with regards to the provisions of

Section 252, vis-à-vis Section 226 of RA. 7160.

Under the provisions of Section 252, the taxpayer must file a written

protest or claim within thirty (30) days from the payment, under protest, of the tax

in question with the local treasurer who shall decide the claim within sixty (60)

from receipt thereof and, if the treasurer denies the claim or fails to act on it

within said period, the taxpayer may appeal to the Local Board as provided for in

Chapter 3, Title Two, Book II of the Code, referring to Section 226. Section 226,

in turn, provides that a taxpayer who is not satisfied with the assessment may

appeal to the Local Board within sixty (60) days from the date of his receipt of the

written notice of assessment.

We can think of only two (2) instances under Title Two, Book II, of the

Local Government Code of 1991 where a taxpayer may appeal to the local board

or file a claim with the local treasurer, namely: (1) when the taxpayer is not

satisfied with, or disputes, an assessment by an assessor for whatever ground or

reason, be it that the assessment is unjust, erroneous or improper, illegal or void

or excessive or unreasonable; and (2) when an assessment of basic real

property tax, or any other tax levied under Title Two, Book II of the Code, is

found to be illegal or erroneous and the tax is accordingly reduced or adjusted.

In the first case or instance, the taxpayer, before paying the realty tax

involved, may appeal the disputed assessment to the local board within sixty (60)

days from receipt of the written notice of assessment, as provided under Section

226 of the Code. Under the second case, the taxpayer actually pays the realty

Reference: Book XIII, pp. 54-76

tax involved, or any other tax levied under Title Two, Book II of the Code, with the

honest belief that the same tax is rightfully due from him. It is only when the tax

involved “is found to be illegal or erroneous and the tax is accordingly reduced or

adjusted,” that “the taxpayer may file a written claim for refund or credit for taxes

and interests with the provincial or city treasurer within two (2) years from the

date the taxpayer is entitled to such reduction or adjustment” as provided under

Section 253 of the Code.

Unlike Sections 226 and 253, Section 252 does not lay down the

circumstances upon which its provisions may be applied. So, when or under what

circumstances shall the provisions of Section 252 apply? We could not conceive

of any.

A taxpayer who avails himself of the remedy provided for under Section

252 risks the possibility that, when the claim is denied expressly or through

inaction by the treasurer, the prescriptive period of appeal for under Section 226

shall have expired. If the taxpayer is still allowed to appeal with the Local Board

the treasurer’s denial or inaction even after the expiration of sixty (60) days from

and after receipt of the written notice of assessment, Section 226 would be

rendered nugatory.

We believe, therefore, and so hold, that the Local Board erred in

dismissing the appeal for lack of prior payment of taxes on the questioned

assessments.

SECOND ISSUE

Stated concisely, the second issue is: WHETHER OR NOT THE

RESPONDENT PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR HAD THE AUTHORITY, POWER,

AND/OR JURISDICTION TO ISSUE THE QUESTIONED ASSESSMENT.

Both Petitioners-Appellants and Respondent-Appellee Provincial Assessor

keep on emphasizing the “Notices of Assessments” as the subject matters of the

appeal. We take it that Petitioners-Appellants are not really questioning the

Reference: Book XIII, pp. 54-76

issuance of the “notices” but, rather, the issuance of the assessments

themselves which are the subject matter of said “notices”.

Under the provisions of Section 223 of RA 7160, when real property is

assessed for the first time or when an existing assessment is increased or

decreased, the provincial, city or municipal assessor shall within thirty (30) days

give written notice of such new or revised assessment to the person in whose

name the property is declared. Under these circumstances, the assessors are

not only authorized, but also mandated, by law to issue such written notices of

assessments, notwithstanding the validity or invalidity of the assessments

concerned.

The function of the Notice of Assessment is to establish the starting point

of the prescriptive period within which a taxpayer may appeal to the Local Board,

that is, sixty (60) days from date of his receipt of the Notice of Assessment as

provided for under Section 226 of RA 7160.

At any rate, Petitioners-Appellants contend that Respondent-Appellee

Provincial Assessor had no authority to issue the questioned assessments for the

simple reason that the Schedule of Fair Market Values, upon which the

questioned assessments were based, was not enacted by ordinance by the

Sanggunian of Easter Samar but approved by the said Sanggunian through a

mere resolution, contrary to the provisions of Sections 212 and 218, both of R.A.

7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.

On the other hand, Respondent Provincial Assessor argues that, although

the approval of the Schedule of Fair Market Values was entitled “Resolution No.

45, Series of 2002: A Resolution by the Sanggunian Panlalawigan of Eastern

Samar approving the Schedule of Market Values for the 2002 General Revision

of Real Properties in the Province of Eastern Samar”, the intent or contents

therein partake of the nature of or is actually an Ordinance.

Sections 212 and 218 of RA 7160 provides, thus:

“SEC. 212. Preparation of Schedule of Fair Market Values. – Before any general revision of property assessment is made pursuant to the provisions of

Reference: Book XIII, pp. 54-76

this Title, there shall be prepared a schedule of fair market values by the provincial, city or municipal assessors of the municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila Area for the different classes of real property situated in their respective local government units for enactment by ordinance of the sanggunian concerned. The schedule of fair market values shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, city or municipality concerned, or in the absence thereof, shall be posted in the provincial capitol, city or municipal hall and in two other conspicuous places therein.” (Emphasis supplied)

“SEC. 218. Assessment Levels. – The assessment levels to be applied to the fair market value of real property to determine its assessed value shall be fixed by ordinances of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panglunsod or sangguniang bayan of a municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area, at the rates not exceeding the following. . .” (Emphasis supplied)

How does an ordinance differ from a resolution? Article 107 of the Rules

and Regulations implementing the Local Government of 1991 provides the rules

governing the enactment of ordinances and resolutions, thus:

“ART. 107. Ordinances and Resolutions. – The following rules shall govern the enactment of ordinances and resolutions:

(a) Legislative actions of a general and permanent character shall be enacted in the form of ordinances, while those which are of temporary character shall be passed in the form of resolutions. Matters relating to proprietary functions and to private concerns shall also be acted upon by resolution.
(b) Proposed ordinances and resolutions shall be in writing and shall contain an assigned number, a title or caption, an enacting or ordaining clause, and the date of its proposed effectivity. In addition, every proposed ordinance shall be accompanied by a brief explanatory note containing the justification for its approval. It shall be signed by the author or authors and submitted to the secretary of the sanggunian who shall report the same to the sanggunian at its next meeting.
(c) A resolution shall be enacted in the same manner prescribed for an ordinance, except that it need not go through a third reading for its final consideration unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the sanggunian members.

x x x.”

As clearly stated in the above-quoted rules, Legislative actions of a general

and permanent character shall be enacted in the form of ordinances, while those

which are of temporary character shall be passed in the form of resolutions. A

resolution shall be enacted in the same manner prescribed for an ordinance,

except that it need not go through a third reading for its final consideration unless

decided otherwise by a majority of all the sanggunian members.

We do not agree with Respondent-Appellee’s contention that Resolution

No. 45 has “the intent or contents” of an ordinance. A perusal of said resolution

would readily reveal that its form and substance are far from those of an

ordinance. When a Schedule of Fair Market Values is enacted into or by

Reference: Book XIII, pp. 54-76

ordinance, the schedule is incorporated in, and becomes the main body or

subject matter of, the ordinance, not just a separate document supposedly

approved by mere reference through a resolution.

Ordinance is synonymous with law, rule, regulation, or statute. Law, in its

specific application, implies prescription and enforcement by a ruling authority. A

rule may not be authoritatively enforced, but it is generally observed in the

interests of order, uniformity, etc. Regulation refers to a rule of a group or

organization, enforced by authority. A statute is a law enacted by a legislative

body. An ordinance is a local, generally municipal law.

A resolution, on the other hand, is a formal statement of opinion or

determination by an assembly, etc. A resolution is passive in character,

containing no sanctions for non-compliance thereof. In contrast, an ordinance is

active in character, with penalties for violations of its provisions.

We believe, therefore, and so hold, that the “Schedule of Market Values for

the 2002 General Revision of Real Properties in the Province of Eastern Samar”

is ineffective for failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar to

enact the same schedule by ordinance.

With the above findings, the other issues raised by Petitioners-Appellants

are rendered moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the questioned assessments herein are hereby

DECLARED null and void for lack of authority on the part of Respondent

Provincial Assessor to issue said assessments.

SO ORDERED.

Manila, Philippines, January 11, 2006.

(Signed) CESAR S. GUTIERREZ
Chairman

(Signed) (Signed)

Reference: Book XIII, pp. 54-76

ANGEL P. PALOMARES Member

RAFAEL O. CORTES Member

Reference: Book XIII, pp. 54-76