Republic of the Philippines
CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS Manila
THE PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR PROVINCE OF BATANGAS,
Respondent-Appellant,
-versus-
THE LOCAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT CBAA CASE NO. L-39 OF THE PROVINCE OF BATANGAS,
Appellee,
-and-
PUYAT STEEL CORPORATION, Petitioner-Appellee.
x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x
D E C I S I O N
This is an appeal from the Order of the Local Board of Assessment
Appeals of Batangas, dated April 20, 2003 and received by the appellant on May
8, 2003, on the following grounds:
I. THE LBAA ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE APPEAL TAKEN
BY THE APPELLEES FROM THE ASSESSMENT OF THE
PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR WAS FILED OUT OF TIME, HENCE
SHOULD HAVE BEEN OUTRIGHTLY DISMISSED BY THE LBAA.
II. THE LBAA ERRED IN ENTERTAINING THE SUBJECT PETITION
CONSIDERING THAT NO PAYMENT UNDER PROTEST HAD
BEEN MADE BY THE APPELLEES.
III. THE LBAA ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE QUESTIONED
ASSESSMENTS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE
THE FACTS AND THE CASE
On October 20, 1998, then Provincial Assessor, Lauro C. Andaya sent a
letter to Puyat Steel Corporation, the herein appellee thru Mrs. Arlene Mariano,
Administration and Finance Manager of Puyat Steel Corporation, inviting her
attention to the provisions of Sec. 203 of Republic Act 7160, also known as the
Local Government Code, regarding the filing of sworn statement declaring the
true and current value of the plant building, machinery and equipment of the said
Reference: Book XII, pp. 36-43
company installed and located in Brgy. Masaya, Rosarion, Batangas. The letter
was received by the appellee on November 6, 1998.
The appellee gave no response to the said first letter, and so the erstwhile
Provincial Assessor Andaya sent another letter to Mrs. Mariano on December 17,
1998 reiterating the need of her company to file the required sworn statement. In
the second letter, it was stated that in the event that the corporation will again
ignore the filing of the sworn statement, the Provincial Assessor would declare
the property at P1.5 Billion sourced from DWAM News Bureau. The letter was
received by the appellee on January 14, 1999.
Receiving no response to the second letter, Mr. Andaya summoned Ms.
Arlene Mariano in his letter dated February 3, 1999 to appear before the
Provincial Assessor’s Office on February 22, 1999 in order to give information
concerning the ownership, nature, amount and value of the property of Puyat
Steel Corporation for assessment purposes pursuant to Sec. 213 of R.A. 7160.
The fourth and final letter to the Provincial Assessor was sent on May 21,
1999 giving Ms. Arlene Mariano until May 31 of that same year to finally submit
the requested sworn statement otherwise inspection was to be expected on June
14, 1999. The letter was received on May 31, 1999.
All four letters sent by Mr. Andaya were not favored with any reply by the
appellee prompting the former to conduct an inspection of the plant building,
machinery and equipment of the appellee on June 15, 1999. Exercising the
powers vested upon him under the provisions of Sec. 204 of R.A. 7160, Mr.
Andaya made assessments on the properties of the appellees contained in five
(5) tax declarations, particularly, Tax Declaration Nos. 027-00586, 027-00587,
027-00588, 027-00589 and 027-00590 all effective in 1999 except for Tax
Declaration No. 027-00587. Warehouse Expansion with effectivity in 2000.
On November 3, 1999, the Notice of Assessment and Tax Bill was issued
Puyat Steel Corporation. The same was received as shown in the registry return
Reference: Book XII, pp. 36-43
receipt bearing date, December 9, 1999 per rubber stamp mark of the Batangas
Post Office.
On April 30, 2002, the Provincial Treasurer of Batangas issued a Warrant
of Levy on the properties of Puyat Steel Corporation for the total amount of tax
delinquencies of P74,574,595.86 covering tax years/period of 1999 to April 2002.
In view of the said Warrant of Levy, the appellee particularly paid the
amount totaling Three Million Four Hundred Forty Four Thousand One Hundred
Forty Four Pesos & 59/100 P3,444,144.59) on May 24, 2002, and on July 9,
2002. It is expressly annotated on the official receipts issued that such payments
were made by virtue of the Warrant of Levy.
On July 9, 2002 Puyat Steel Corporation filed a Petition before the Local
Board of Assessment Appeals appealing the assessment on the properties
covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 027-00586, 027-00587, 027-00588, 027-00589
and 027-00590, praying for the revision, reduction or adopting altogether of
another assessment level on the said properties.
The LBAA issued the questioned Order dated April 20, 2003, hence the
foregoing appeal, pursuant to Section 229 of the Local Government Code.
During the last hearing of this case on March 19, 2004, both appellant and
appellees manifested that they be given up to April 12, 2004 to come up with a
compromise agreement. This Board in line with the Supreme Court’s program of
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) supports and encourage such
developments. The parties were given up to April 12, 2004 within which to file or
submit the said compromise agreement. It was agreed upon by the parties to
submit the case for resolution in the event that they failed to resolve the case
amicably by that date. More than a year had passed and not even a whimper
was heard from both parties.
This case then is deemed submitted for resolution.
In all judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings, once the issue of jurisdiction
is raised, it must be first be addressed and settled before all others, including the
Reference: Book XII, pp. 36-43
merits can be discussed. It is basic that since jurisdiction is the power and legal
authority to hear and decide justiciable issues, the lacd or loss of it will render all
proceedings before the courts, boards, or tribunals a nullity. Jurisdiction therefore
takes precedence over and above all issues and that is the reason why we will
tackle it first.
The following facts are not contested.
The appellant sent the notice of assessment and tax bill to the appellee on
November 3, 1999 and was received by the latter on December 7, 1999. It was
only on July 9, 2002 that the appellee filed before the Local Board of Batangas a
petition praying for the revision, reduction or adopting another assessment level
on its properties. From the receipt of the notice of assessment to the filing of the
petition with the LBAA is a total of two years, seven months, and two days.
Under section 226 of R.A. 7160, the dissatisfied owner or person having legal
interest in the property has only sixty (60) days from receipt of the notice of
assessment in which to appeal or question before the LBAA the assessment.
Clearly the reglementary period to appeal had lapsed many times over.
What is the effect of such lapse?
The Supreme Court and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in a
long line of rulings and holdings consistently maintained that perfection of the
appeal within the reglementary period is mandatory and jurisdictional, to wit:
“The Local Board might not even have acquired jurisdiction over the case.
Settled is the principle that the requirement regarding the perfection of appeals
within the reglementary period is not only mandatory but jurisdictional.” (Roman
Catholic Archbishop vs. Director of Lands, 34 Phils. 623, Provincial Assessor of
Bulacan vs. Luzon Cement Corp. and Lucenco Marketing Inc. and BAA of
Bulacan, CBAA Case No. 16, Bermudez vs. Director of Lands, 36 Phil. 774)
“For failure of Getty Oil (Phil.) to make a timely appeal with the Local
Board, the disputed assessment had become final, conclusive and unapealable
long before this case was originally filed in the Local Board, in view of which this
Reference: Book XII, pp. 36-43
case should have been dismissed.” (City Assessor of General Santos vs. BAA of
General Santos and Getty Oil (Phil.) CBAA Case No. 39.
“When the appeal was filed out of time, it was as if no appeal had been
filed, and in fact the petitioner-appellant was “deprived of his right to be heard in
that Board.” Therefore, the assessment made by the City Assessor was not
disturbed and has remained enforceable.
It has been held that the remedy of a taxpayer who disagrees with a tax
assessment is to appeal to the Local Board and that his failure to do so
constitutes a waiver of the defenses against the assessment and stops him from
subsequently raising his objection thereto, otherwise, the period of sixty days for
appeal to the Local Board would make little sense.” (Unlad Resources
Development Corp. vs. BAA of Manila and City Assessor of Manila, CBAA Case
No. 121, Republic vs. Del Rosario, 105 Phil. 277, Uy Ham vs. Republic, 106 Phil.
1162)
All these self-explanatory pronouncements are fatal to the cause of the
petitioner.
The “undelivered letter addressed to the Provincial Assessor coursed thru
the Mayor of Rosario, Batangas” merit scant consideration from this Board. It
was not addressed to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals and not in the
proper form, hence cannot be considered as the appeal contemplated by law. At
most, it is a motion for reconsideration on the assessment made by the assessor.
Moreover, this practice was interdicted by the Supreme Court in the Callanta
case (G.R. Nos. 115253-74, January 30, 1998) as a remedy not sanctioned by
law.
Similarly situated is the time barred petition filed against the assessor by
the petitioner-appellant before the Local Board on July 5, 2002 praying for the
revision, reduction, etc. of the latter’s assessments. It is rather strange why the
Local Board, instead of dismissing the petition for being belatedly filed, would
consider it as filed under section 252 of R.A. 7160 when it is obvious that it was
Reference: Book XII, pp. 36-43
filed against the assessor for revision and/or reduction of the assessments. The
Local Board should know or ought to know that it is the treasurer who is the
respondent under sec. 252. Said appeal is for the recovery of taxes paid under
protest denied or not acted upon by the treasurer.
The Highest Court ruled that “the right to appeal is a mere statutory
privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provision of law.” (Bello vs. Fernando, G.R. L-16970; Tirono vs. Caluag, G.R. No.
344001). This Board also held that “finding the present appeal not made in the
manner and in accordance with the provisions of the Real Property Tax Code, to
our mind it may not be exercised by respondent-appellant. (City Assessor of
Baguio vs. BAA of Baguio City and Benguet Consolidated Inc. CBAA Case No.
46)
In view of the foregoing, the original petition filed before the Local Board
not made in the manner and in accordance with law, and being filed only after
two years, seven months and two days after the receipt of the notice of
assessment way beyond the 60 day period as provided by law is clearly in
violation of that statutory privilege.
The petitioner-appellee is trying to invoke equity to persuade this Board to
favor its cause. A legal maxim, revered and held sacred both in the courts of law
and equity states “those who come to equity, must come with unblemished
hands.” From the time Ms. Arlene Mariano, Administration and Finance Manager
of petitioner-appellee repeatedly ignored and disregarded the appellants
requests and admonitions for them to voluntary file the sworn statements of the
fair and current market values of its properties as required by law, the
undelivered letter to the assessor irregularly addressed to a Mayor with attendant
negligence, up to its failure to appeal grossly on time during the 60 day period
allowed by law, are actuations undeserving of equitable considerations. Equity
frowns upon those who disregard the laws and sleep on their rights.
Reference: Book XII, pp. 36-43
This Board finds for the appellant who correctly questioned the lack of
jurisdiction of the Local Board. The reglementary period to appeal being both
mandatory and jurisdictional, serves as a bar to those who failed to observe it.
Non observance of the prescriptive period to appeal deprives the Local Board of
its original jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition.
We deemed it unnecessary to delve on the other issues raised after finding
that the Local Board has no jurisdiction, rendering all its proceedings an exercise
in futility. The assessments of the appellant has become final and the right of the
local government to collect the taxes has become absolute.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Order is set aside and relegated to the
dustbin of nullity. The assailed tax assessments are considered final, undisturbed
and enforceable.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, April 19, 2005.
(Signed) CESAR S. GUTIERREZ
Chairman
(Signed)
ANGEL P. PALOMARES Member
(Signed) RAFAEL O. CORTES
Member
Reference: Book XII, pp. 36-43